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INTRODUCTION
Appeals to legislative intent are a commonplace part of our judicial
process. Nevertheless there are many unresolved disputes about the
existence and discoverability of legislative intent. In 1930, Max Radin
argued that the presence of genuine legislative intent in connection with
a statute is at best a rare circumstance and that, in any event, the legisla-
tive intent could not be discovered from the records of the legislative
proceedings.' This argument drew an immediate response from James
Landis. Landis distinguished between two senses of "intent"- "intent"
as "intended meaning" and "intent" as "purpose." He maintained that
legislative intent in the first sense (and apparently in the second also)
is an ordinary although not invariable feature of legislative processes.
Furthermore, he contended that this feature, when present, is clearly
discoverable in the records of the legislative proceedings.
2
The Radin-Landis dispute has had a curious history. Since 1930,
treatises and articles on statutory interpretation have often mentioned
the dispute and have sometimes taken sides. But commentators siding
with Radin, although abandoning talk about legislative intent, proceed
to talk freely about the "legislative purposes," "policies," and "objec-
tives" of statutes. Because it is not obvious that these expressions refer
to anything different from legislative intent,3 one would expect careful
discussion of where the differences lie. In particular, one would expect
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1. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. RxV. 863 (1930). Radin also denied the
relevance of appeals to legislative intent. This article, however, is only concerned with the
prior questions of the existence and discoverability of legislative intent. For earlier criti-
cisms of the notion of legislative intent, see SEanwicK, THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 327-28 (2d ed. 1874); Bruncken, Interpretation
of Written Law, 25 YALE L.J. 129 (1915); KocouREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENcX OF
LAW 201 (1930).
2. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1930).
3. As Johnstone remarks, "purpose" often seems simply another name for intent.
Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 KANs. L. REv. 1, 15
(1954). See also Bruncken, supra note 1, at 134.
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to find a showing that arguments leading to the rejection of talk about
legislative intent have no force against these new expressions. But no
such showing is to be found in the leading discussions of the matter-
including those by Willis,4 Frankfurter, CorryG and Radin himself.7
On the other hand, commentators siding with Landis have done so
on the basis of inadequate arguments. For example, we find Radin
falsely accused of assuming "that the legislative intent is the sum of the
total intents of the individual members of the legislature." This is
accompanied by the mysterious assertion that the intention of the
legislature is "not a collection of subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices
of individuals, but rather the objective footprints left on the trail of
legislative enactment."9 Such a statement is mysterious because it
appears to mistake what could at most be evidence of intent for intent
itself. It is surely in need of further elucidation and support if it is to
show Radin wrong.
Again, we find unsupported assumptions that statutes would be
wholly meaningless in the absence of anything identifiable as legisla-
tive intent,10 and that the meaning assigned to them "must be one in-
tended by the law-makers or the law-makers do not legislate."" Such
remarks raise interesting issues, but, as will be seen below, the argu-
ments supporting them cannot stand.
These claims and counterclaims are fully representative of the curious
career of the Radin-Landis dispute. Writers siding with Radin appar-
ently find it impossible to reject every trace of what he rejected. Writers
siding with Landis have done so on the basis of inadequate (although
sometimes interesting) arguments. Clearly the issues raised by the dis-
pute have not yet been satisfactorily resolved, and are still in need of
careful discussion.
I
The most obvious difficulty with the notion of legislative intent
concerns the relationship between the intent of a collegiate legislature
4. Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR. REv. 1 (1938).
5. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L REV. 527
(1947).
6. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, I U. Tono.cro L.J. 286
(1936). See also Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32
CAN. BAR REv. 624 (1954).
7. Radin, A Short way With Statutes, 56 HAav. L. REv. 388 (1942).
8. See 2 SuTHERLAD, STATUns AND STrAtroRY Co.sntucno. 322 (3d ed. 1943). For
what Radin actually says see Radin, supra note 1, at 870.
9. Ibid.
10. Cf. CRAWFODPD, THE CONSRaMUGrO1 OF STATUTES 255 (1940).
11. Id. at 256.
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and the intentions of the several legislators. Many difficulties would
remain, however, if a legislature had only one authoritative member.
We would profit, therefore, by asking what it could mean to speak of
the legislative intent of a single legislator.
The fundamental question "what was the legislator's intent" sub-
sumes a number of more specific questions:
1. Was his intent to enact a statute-i.e., was the "enacting" per-
formance not, perchance, done accidentally, inadvertently or by
mistake?
2. Was his intent to enact this statute-i.e., was this the document
(the draft) he thought he was endorsing?
3. Was his intent to enact this statute-i.e., are the words in this
document precisely those he supposed to be there when he en-
acted it as a statute?
4. Was his intent to enact this statute-i.e., do these words mean
precisely what he supposed them to mean when he endorsed their
use in the statute?
5. How did he intend these words to be understood?
6. What was his intent in enacting the statute-i.e., what did he in-
tend the enactment of the statute to achieve?
7. What was his intent in enacting the statute-i.e., what did he
intend the enactment of the statute to achieve in terms of his
own career?
2
Failure to distinguish between these more specific questions is re-
sponsible for much of the confusion in debates about the existence,
discoverability and relevance of legislative intent. It is therefore impor-
tant to examine closely the relationships between the more trouble-
some of these questions.
A. The Aims of the Legislator: the distinction between
6. What did he intend enactment of the statute to achieve? and
7. What did he intend enactment to achieve in terms of his own
career?
These questions distinguish between two kinds of reasons the legis-
12. Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The
Middle Road": I, 40 TExAs L. Rav. 751, 796-800 (1962), distinguishes twenty-two "forms
or configurations of legislative purpose that may be discovered at work in any particular
legislative process productive of a statute." He does not attempt to order his list as I have,
but I believe that it all lies somewhere within the range of my Nos. 3-6. Some of the
entries are further specifications of what I have distinguished; but some of them also
appear to conflate matters I wish to keep distinct; e.g., his Nos. 5-8 each could cover what
I wish to distinguish above in (4) and (5).
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lator may have for enacting a statute-reasons looking to the effects of
enactment upon the legal system, and reasons looking to the effects.of
enactment on his own career.13 This distinction is crucial to any dis-
cussion of the relevance of legislative intent, since judges and adminis-
trators are unlikely to regard as significant the legislator's concern
with his own career. The distinction is also important when one is
discussing the existence and discoverability of legislative intent. To
say there was no intent at all, for example, might mean that the enact-
ment was motiveless, e.g., inadvertent or accidental. On the other hand,
it might mean that no intent of the relevant sort was present, that the
legislator had only his personal career in mind when enacting the
statute. Furthermore, depending on the records available, one kind of
intent might be discoverable while the other is not. Thus the two must
be kept distinct.
B. Intent as Intended Meaning and Intent as Purpose: the distinction
between
6. What did he intend the enactment of the statute to achieve? and
5. How did he intend these words to be understood?
Landis notes the way the distinction between intent as (intended)
meaning and intent as purpose becomes obscured when he says:
Purpose and meaning commonly react upon each other. Their
exact differentiation would require an extended philosophical
essay ... [T]he Distinction ... is a nice one.'4
Even though the distinction may be a "nice one," no lengthy essay is
needed to underscore the importance of distinguishing questions about
the purposes of specific legislators from general questions about the
meanings of statutory words. The major source of confusion has been the
belief that we must always guide our understanding of statutory words by
an understanding of legislative purposes, as though we could not under-
stand the words without prior knowledge of the purposes." This
belief is most readily countered with the reminder that our primary
source of "evidence" of specific legislative purposes in connection with
13. Cf. Radin, supra note 1, p. 873. See de Sloovbre, Preliminary Questions in
Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407, 415 (1932), where his remark about "indi-
vidual and combined motives" encourages, if it does not actually constitute, a conflation of
the questions.
14. See Note, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 H-Luv. L REv. 88, 888 (1930).
15. Cf. CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 255-56; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950); Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 765.
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a statute generally lies in the words of the statute itself, and that these
words could not provide such evidence if their meanings were not
determined independently of consideration of the purposes in
question.16
Confusion about the interplay between purpose and meaning has
become so embedded in discussions of statutory interpretation that a
more extended argument may be desirable. In particular, it may be
helpful to show that the distinction between purpose and meaning
exists even when the considerable concessions suggested by question 5
are made in the direction of establishing a connection between the
purpose of a legislator and the meaning of what he says in a statute.
Suppose we stipulate (i) that a legislator's words always mean precisely
what he thinks they mean, and (ii) that the purposes in question con-
cern the career of the statute rather than the career of the legislator.
The first stipulation seems to go as far as possible in the direction of a
tight connection between statutory meaning and the intentions or
purposes of the legislator. The second stipulation restricts the purposes
in question to those most generally thought to enter legitimately into
issues of statutory interpretation. Even with these stipulations, how-
ever, one may show that persons normally need not be aware of
legislative purposes in order to understand legislative words.
Although the problem is an "interpreter's" problem, it will be
helpful to consider the matter first from the point of view of the
legislator, and on the simplifying assumption that he is the author of
the statutes he enacts.11 He is typically interested in enacting a piece
of legislation because he wants to effect certain changes in the society.
The words he uses are the instruments by means of which he expects or
hopes to effect these changes. What gives him this expectation or this
hope is his belief that he can anticipate how others (e.g., judges and
administrators) will understand these words. The words would be
useless to him if he could not anticipate how they would be understood
by these other persons. Insofar as this concern for how his words will be
understood is a concern about the "meaning" of his words, this "mean-
ing" must thus generally be determinable independently of consider-
ation of his purposes; for, until he forms opinions about the "meaning"
of the words, he cannot consider whether they will serve his purpose.
16. Cf. E. A. DREiDGER, THE COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATION 159 (1957). It is true that we
sometimes allow our understanding of legislative purposes to shcd light on puzzling pas.
sages in a statute. But we could not even attempt this if we did not believe we already
understood most of the words in the statute.
17. Complications introduced by the presence of draftsmen who are not themselves
legislators will be considered later in connection with the intentions of collegiate bodies
such as modem legislatures.
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The legislator can attempt to assure that his words will be correctly
understood in various ways, e.g., by stipulation. But if he stipulates he
must use other words about which he will have the same general con-
cern. Ultimately, he must recognize that with the bulk of his words he
cannot create but only can utilize the conventions in the light of which
his words will be understood.18 The legislator will be interested pri-
marily in the conventions of statutory interpretation-that is, in the
current conventional approaches by judges, administrators, lawryers and
citizens to the understanding of statutes. Although these conventions
will not guarantee specific results, they are all that he has to work with.
Consider the matter now from the point of view of the interpreters
of statutes. Maintaining a perspective favorable to the association of
legislative purpose with statutory meaning, suppose that the interpreters
declare themselves bound by what the legislator wanted at the time
the statute was enacted. Suppose, in particular, that, rather than
raising any questions about how the legislator ought to have ex-
pected his words to be understood, the interpreters assume that their
only legitimate task is the discovery of the legislator's actual expecta-
tions.
Difficulties arise immediately. There may be a lack of fit between
how the legislator expected the words of the statute to be understood,
and what he hoped to achieve by means of the statute. That is, the
statute itself, or some constituent parts of it, may have been poorly
chosen instruments for the achievement of his goals-not in the sense
that the words were not understood as he expected them to be, but
rather in the sense that, even when the words were understood as he
expected, behavior in accordance with this understanding did not pro-
duce the results he thought it would produce. There are, in short,
18. Of course, one convention of statutory interpretation might permit or require that
one's understanding of statutory language be guided by consideration of the legislator's
purpose. Cf., 2 SunnrLAxD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 315. Such a convention would invite
the legislator to attempt to lay down a trail of his "purposes" for others to follow; hence
the use, in jurisdictions where legislators believe that interpreters of statutes will seek and
heed such "evidence," of statutory preambles, carefully manufactured "legislative histo-
ries," etc. The only feature of note about this convention is that it offers the legislator
an opportunity to influence rather than merely to anticipate how his statutory words
ill be understood. In this respect, it is analogous to conventions for stipulation and for
formal definition. Nevertheless, the "trail" he is able to lay down, both within and
outside of the statute, will be primarily if not exclusively a verbal one. As with stipulations,
if the legislator believes he can influence the understanding of his statutory words, it is
only because he has certain expectations about how certain other words will be understood.
These expectations also must be formed independently of consideration of his purposes,
because until he has the expectations he can have no notion of whether these other words
will serve his purposes.
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at least two distinct ways in which things could go wrong from the
legislator's point of view: (1) people might not understand the words
of the statute in the way he thought they would, or (2) the behavior of
people who understand the words as he thought they would and who
act truly in accordance with this understanding, might not produce
the results that the legislator anticipated. In the first case, the legislator
would have made a mistake in predicting how his words would be
understood; in the second case, he would have made a mistake in pre-
dicting what would happen if people behaved in certain ways.' 0 The
difference between the two kinds of mistakes is obscured for the
"interpreter," and his view of statutory interpretation is consequently
muddied, if he supposes that an understanding of the legislator's "pur-
poses" is either a sufficient or normally necessary guide to how the
legislator expected the words of the statute to be understood.
As the legislator may simply have misjudged the effectiveness of the
statutory scheme in achieving the purported purpose, a resolve to in-
terpret the words of the statute so that the statute will be an effective
instrument for the achievement of the purpose would be simply a re-
fusal to consider the possibility of this kind of legislative misjudgment.
The importance of this observation lies in the fact that, where such
legislative misjudgment has actually occurred, the method of interpre-
tation under consideration may not produce an understanding of the
words of the statute corresponding to that which the legislator expected
-the very understanding that figured in his deliberate choice of those
words. In the end, there may be nothing wrong with this; the legislator
may be delighted with a method of interpretation which hides his own
misjudgment. But are the interpreters really being faithful to the "in-
tentions" of the legislator when they interpret his words differently
from what he had expected?20 At the very least, this problem should be
brought into the open and faced squarely-something that has not
been done and is not likely to be done so long as intent as "meaning"
and intent as purpose are conflated.
One may wonder how intended legislative meaning could possibly
19. The distinction between the two is clear enough even though there may be a large
shadowy area between them where the legislator's expectations were not well-formed,
and where even he might not be able to say whether, on the one hand, his words had
not been understood as he expected, or rather, on the other hand, that he had proposed
in the statute an ineffective way of achieving what he wished to achieve. See HAGERSTROM,
INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MoRAs 79-81 (Broad trans. 1953).
20. Hagerstrom apparently thinks that the whole "intention" theory founders on
just this issue. See HAGERSTROM, op. cit. supra note 19, at 99-101. And for people who come
down on different sides of the question, see 2 Ausinw, LECrUREs ON JUluSRUDENcM 628-30
(5th ed. 1885); and Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 831-32.
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be discovered without appeal to knowledge of legislative purpose. The
answer is that discovery depends primarily upon our awareness of the
linguistic conventions the legislator looked to in forming his expecta-
tions about how his words would be understood. Awareness of these
conventions will provide us with good (although not infallible) grounds
for believing we know what his expectations were. Moreover, there is
no great problem in attaining this awareness. We know perfectly well
how to tell whether a man speaks the same language we do, and how
to tell whether we can speak his language. Our capacity to do this
provides us with a generally adequate basis for determining when the
legislator and we are both familiar with the linguistic conventions
in the light of which various understandings of his words will be
formed, and for determining whether we can understand these conven-
tions in the same ways. Further, if we are the specific audience to
whom his remarks are directed, we are merely asking ourselves what
our own linguistic conventions are, and how well he might have under-
stood them. The fact that statutory language ordinarily serves us quite
well in this respect indicates that we are able to use the same linguistic
conventions as the legislator and to know that we are doing so.
In sum, for us as well as for the legislator, practical understanding
of his language is ordinarily founded on a grasp of the linguistic con-
ventions utilized, rather than a grasp of his specific purposes in enacting
the statute. This explains both how his words can serve us as evidence
of his purposes, and why there is ordinarily no need to search for his
purposes in order to understand what he meant.
C. Can the Legislator Misunderstand His Own Words? the distinction
between
4. Do these words mean precisely what he supposed them to mean
when he endorsed their use in the statute? and
5. How did he intend these words to be understood?
Question (4) pinpoints, as question (5) does not, the possibility that
the legislator has misunderstood the words he used in a statutory docu-
ment. Reading some discussions on statutory interpretation, one would
think it impossible for a legislator to misunderstand what he has written
or endorsed.2' In these discussions, the entire burden of understanding
or misunderstanding the statute seemingly is placed upon others-the
judge, the lawyer, the citizen. The effective slogan of these discussions
might well be that the words of the statute mean -what their author-
21. Cf. CRAwFoR, op. cit. supra note 10, at 245; 2 SUTULAND, op. cit. supra note 8. at
315-16.
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endorser (the legislator) intended them to mean. But, as we have seen,
words in statutes are of use both to legislators and to others because
they have acquired significance through the growth or stipulation of
conventions regarding their use. Indeed, we could not recognize some-
thing as a word, rather tflan as merely a contour (or range of contours)
of sounds or a certain form (or range of forms) of scribblings if we were
not aware that sounds and scribblings with such contours and forms
have a significance, function, or value resulting from the growth or
stipulation of such conventions. Our belief that we can understand
what a man says, and his belief that he will be understood, mutually
depend upon the recognition, acceptance, and utilization of such con-
ventions. Furthermore, as we have also noted, even when such conven-
tions are stipulated by a speaker, the stipulations ultimately rely upon
words whose meanings are not stipulated but are assumed to be already
understood in the light of existing conventions. It follows that if a
speaker is not understood as he expected to be, this may be because he
misunderstood or because some member of his audience misunderstood
linguistic conventions of which they should have been aware.
Of course, having recognized that a legislator might possibly mis-
understand the conventions determining the commonly accepted sig-
nificance of the words he uses, we might for some reason wish to give
more importance to his (mistaken) beliefs about the significance of his
words than to their actual significance-that is, we might feel bound
more by what he meant to say than by what, on any ordinary view, he
did say. We could remind ourselves of this with the slogan that the
words in statutory documents mean what the legislators intended them
to mean, and could regard as always authoritative, even when mistaken,
the beliefs of legislators as to how their words would be understood,
and, in particular, their beliefs as to the commonly accepted signifi-
cance of their words.
The adoption of such a policy, however, would lead to practical
and conceptual problems. The legislator's audience (judges, lawyers,
administrators, citizens) would have to ignore what the legislator said
(the commonly accepted significance of his words) and take upon itself
the responsibility of seeking out what the legislator meant (what he
expected them to understand). A serious attempt to fulfill this responsi-
bility would, to say the least, require complex and tedious investi-
gation. 22 Furthermore, if we insist that the audience is responsible for
22. Judges and commentators, in protesting the seemingly ovenhelming Importance
given to "legislative intent" in statutory interpretation have sometimes been in part pro-
tecting against the placement of this responsibility on the interpreters of statutes. See,
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what the legislator meant rather than for what he said, we must concede
that either (a) the statute consists of the string of words actually on
the rolls, in which case that statute (i.e., that string of words) is not
binding, or (b) the statute is binding but consists of a different string
of words from that on the rolls.
Perhaps this analysis merely reveals that we are in a quandary when
it comes to interpreting statutes. With statutes, some peculiar authority
attaches to what the legislator says (for that is virtually all that most
persons may have to go by), and some authority may attach also to what
the legislator is trying to say (after all, under the separation-of-powers
doctrine we have in some way obligated ourselves to submit to his
wishes on certain matters)..2 3 But at least we need a formulation of
the issues that allows us to see the quandary for what it is. Wholehearted
acceptance of the slogan that statutory words mean what the legislator
intended them to mean would make this insight impossible.
We have seen that appeals to the legislative intent of even a single
legislator are attended by numerous difficulties and sources of confu-
sion. But we have not yet approached the major problem about legis-
lative intent. Judges and administrators appeal to the intent of entire
collegiate legislatures. Many commentators believe that such appeals
are futile-that it is senseless to speak of the intent of a collegiate legis-
lature. Our examination of the intent of the single legislator is a pro-
logue to this central controversy.
II
A. Introduction to the Skeptical Arguments
Does it make any sense at all to talk about the intentions of a col-
legiate legislature? Radin says:
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection
with words which some two or three men drafted, which a con-
siderable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the
approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did
have, different ideas and beliefs.2 4
e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384, 395-96 (1951) (concurring
opinion of Jackson, J.); M fcBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); Quarles, Some
Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law, 3 VAND. L Rnv. 531
(1950).
23. Crawford approaches the problem when he says "And the meaning must be one
intended by the law-makers or the law-makers do not legislate." CuwroRD, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 256. See also Frankfurter, Forward to a Symposium on Statutory Construction,
3 V.AND. L. REV. 365, 366 (1950); P. H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress
Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 537-8 (1948).
24. Radin, supra note 1, at 870.
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Stronger views have been taken. Kocourek's argument to the effect that
such intentions "never existed" is based upon an unsupported assertion
that: "Legislation is a group activity and it is impossible to conceive
a group mind or cerebration." 25 Willis says flatly and without argu-
ment: "A composite body can hardly have a single intent." 2
0 More
recently D. J. Payne also appears to dismiss the possibility when he
says: "[T]he legislature, being a composite body, cannot have a single
state of mind and so cannot have a single intention." 27
Concerning at least the latter three views, there are two issues to be
sorted out: (a) the extent to which they are based on the notion that
two or more men cannot have the same intention, and (b) the extent
to which they are based on the notion that a group of men is incapable
of having an intention. Kocourek's remark appears to raise the second
of these issues; Payne's, despite appearances, raises the first.
Although we shall deal with Payne's arguments more fully below, con-
sider for a moment the supposition in (a). Is it possible for two or more
men to "have a single intention"? Anyone wishing to deny the pos-
sibility must tell us why we cannot truthfully say in the simple case of
two men rolling a log toward the river bank with the purpose of floating
it down the river that there is at least one intention both these men
have-viz., to get the log to the river so that they can float it down
the river. It would be unhelpful to reply that one man's intention can-
not be identical with another man's because each is his own and not
the other's. There is no reason to confine ourselves to counting inten-
tions only in this way. Further, if we did so confine ourselves, the cen-
tral claim that two men cannot have the same intention would turn
out to be merely a disguised tautology.
B. The Deeper Roots of Skepticism
The claim in (b) raises much more difficult issues. Should we agree
that legislatures, being groups of men, cannot have intentions? One
possible argument here might be: legislatures are not men; only men
can have intentions; therefore, legislatures cannot have intentions.
2 8
25. KocouREK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201.
26. Willis, supra note 4, at 3.
27. Payne, The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes, 9 Cult.
RENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 96, 97-8 (1956). I say "appears to" because despite the above state-
ment and several others equally strong, Payne also seems to endorse Gray's view that the
intention of the legislature, far from being always non-existent, is often perfectly obvious.
Id. at 101-02. It also turns out, as we shall see below, that Payne's arguments don't support
a conclusion as strong as that quoted in the text above.
28. But of course this argument will founder on the shoals of debate about whether
things other than men, e.g., animals, have intentions.
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Kocourek makes a more specific claim that there are necessary condi-
tions for having intentions-conditions absent in the case of legislatures.
His candidates are mind and "cerebration."20 But it is clear that the
temptation to name these as necessary conditions lies only in thinking
of them as preconditions for purposive behavior and for deliberation-
two more immediate preconditions for having intentions. When one
moves directly to a consideration of whether legislatures are capable of
purposive behavior and deliberation, the reply that they are seems nei-
ther false nor (without further argument) only figurative. We do, after
all, speak quite freely and precisely about legislatures deliberating, and
this, aside from our talk about their debating, investigating, etc., im-
plies a capacity for purposive behavior. Of course, if someone tried to
elucidate such talk without any reference whatever to the deliberating,
investigating, debating, etc. of officers, members, agents, or employees
of the legislature, we might find this mysterious or unacceptable.
But no one has proposed eliminating these references, and the point
remains that we have clear notions of what it means to say that a
legislature is doing these things and we know that legislatures some-
times do them. Thus, a protest that legislatures do not ever do them,
or, perhaps, do not "literally" do them, is not prima facie intelligible.
But the skeptic may argue that when he claims that a capacity to
deliberate is a necessary condition for having intentions, he is not
thinking of the deliberating in which legislatures are conventionally
said to engage; rather, he is thinking of the deliberating engaged in by
individual men. Though the former normally requires at least some
cases of the latter, the two are not sufficiently alike for him.
The skeptic may feel that the notion of intention and the allied
notions of deliberation, etc. are stretched "too far" when applied to
legislatures. Although no one can say precisely how far is "too far," the
line of reply to the skeptic is clear. Legislatures are not men, and if
only men clearly have intentions, then one's arguments must cultivate
analogies between legislatures and men-the point being to argue that
legislatures are enough like men in important respects to be counted
Perhaps, however, the arguer means to say that talk about the intentions of legislatures
involves a category mistake or a "fallacy of composition." Men have intentions, but
legislatures are associations of men, etc. As it stands, the principle of the argument would
have to be this: from the fact that X is a collection of Y's, it follows that predicates
applicable to rs (taken distributively) are therefore inapplicable to X. There are apparent
counterexamples to the principle-e.g., Jones, the left tackle, is heavier this year than
last; the team of which he is a member is also heavier this year than last. Responses to
such counterexamples will hardly avoid raising the complex issues discussed below.
29. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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as having intentions. Such arguments cannot lead to a discovery that
legislatures might, after all, have intentions. Rather, the arguments
can at most persuade us that it would not, under certain circumstances,
be unreasonable to attribute intentions to legislatures-because the
expression "intention of the legislature" could still have practicable
and reasonable applications without moving from what many people
now understand it to mean, and also without moving too far from what
they understand such an expression as "intention of Jones" to mean.
This is a long road, requiring travel through considerable detail about
legislative procedures and the practices of judges, administrators, etc.
Furthermore, it is a road that does not lead to neat and decisive results.
Perhaps, however, this road can be avoided, and the skeptics challenged
in another manner.
C. The Importance of Legal and Linguistic Conventions
There have long been arguments about the extent to which any
organization or association (e.g., a company, corporation, club, union,
team, etc., as well as a legislature) can, not being a man, nevertheless
behave like or be treated as a man. The view that some can is buttressed
by modem law, which treats certain types of organizations and asso-
ciations in ways that could be variously described as (i) treating them
for certain purposes as (or as though they were) men, and (ii) treating
them in certain respects as (or as though they were) men. Furthermore,
in everyday speech we sometimes speak of them in ways suggesting the
appropriateness of such treatment, and suggesting furthermore the
appropriateness of ascribing intentions to them-e.g., we speak of them
as competing with each other, attempting this, succeeding in that. The
prevailing tendency in most of these cases has been to accept the talk,80
but, when pressed, to attempt to "translate" it into talk about the
intentions or behavior of various members, employees, officers, agents,
or trustees of the organization or association in question. The claim is
30. The acceptance with respect to corporations has sometimes been justified by an
appeal notably absent in discussions of legislative intent-viz., by arguing that the extent
to which corporations may reasonably be treated in this way is simply a matter of public
policy. Thus, for example, against the claim that corporations, unlike men, are solely
creatures of law and hence incapable of illegal intent, one might argue that as a matter
of public policy it would be better to treat corporation as like men in this respect; this
would bring corporate assets and perhaps even corporate officers within easier reach of
sanctions against behavior contrary to the public interest. In contrast to this approach,
the dispute concerning legislative intent has almost universally been treated as though it
were a factual and not a policy issue. The leading question has not been, "what is to
be gained by treating legislatures as capable of intent?" Rather it has been "Are legisla.
tures capable of intent?"
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then common (at least in the Fiction, Bracket, and Purpose Theories
of the nature of corporate personality)31 that the "translation" provides
the truth behind claims about the organizations which, if taken liter-
ally, would simply be fictions.
The skeptic thinks that statements of the form-"The intention of the
legislature is X"-are "fictional" or at best "figurative," and that they
cannot be true if taken "literally." But he would be careless to assert
this in the absence of any clear understanding of the "literal" sig-
nificance of the statements. Since these statements have been made
for several centuries without special stipulation as to their meaning,
what plausible account of their present "literal" significance would
show them to be fictional or figurative? The considerations involved
can perhaps be made clearer by an examination of talk about the
activities of legislatures. Why should we agree that claims such as-
"the legislature enacted a sales tax bill in 1961"--must, when taken
literally, be fictions or only "figurative" even though there are per-
fectly well-established legal criteria for determining what can count
as an act of the legislature? It is true that in order for a legislature to
have acted, it is necessary that certain men have acted. But (i) it would
be a mistake to say that the legislature's having acted was nothing
more than these men having acted.32 And (ii) there is nothing fictional
about the legal significance of the criteria for determining whether the
legislature acted.
In view of well-established legal criteria for telling when legislatures
have acted, and in view of the obvious truth that these criteria are often
satisfied, it seems futilely dogmatic to insist without special excuse that
statements about legislatures having acted can never be lilerally true.
Such statements may sometimes be false, but their sense when taken
"literally" is surely a matter of which conventions are well-established
in, or have been stipulated for, the relevant linguistic community.
The question now is whether there are any such conventions with re-
spect to legislative intentions, and if so, how well-established are they?
It is important to be clear about what is being asked. We are not asking
whether legislatures are conventionally supposed to have intentions;
nor are we asking whether there is "evidence" that is conventionally
supposed to be good evidence of the presence of such intentions. Rather,
we are asking whether there are any generally accepted conventions
31. Cf. PATON, A TEXTBooK OF JURISPRUDENCE 365-376 (3d ed. Derham 1954).
32. It would miss the role of rules in determining which of the activities of these
men could count as activities of the legislature. See H. L. A. Harts discussion of this point
with respect to corporations in HART, DEFINITION AND TEORy IN JURISPRUDENCE 21-24 (1953).
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concerning what it would be like for a legislature to have an intention
-i.e., concerning the conditions that actually would constitute a case
of a legislature's having an intention.
The importance of keeping these questions distinct is shown by the
recent, and otherwise highly rewarding, discussion of similar problems
by Witherspoon.33 Witherspoon seems to consider the matter of legis-
lative purpose from a standpoint much like the above. But he does
not focus the issue sharply enough; as a result he moves too far too
fast. He points to the undeniable fact that courts, administrative agen-
cies, legislators, scholars and practitioners talk in terms of legislative
purpose; he concludes that, given such firmly established practices,
there are such things as legislative purposes.34 This is an error; one
could, if allowed to select the appropriate linguistic communities, use
the same kind of argument to prove the existence of Santa Claus, Zeus,
and dragons. The fact that people talk about certain things as though
they existed does not warrant the conclusion that these things exist.
Nor does the fact that people conventionally appeal to certain kinds
of data as good evidence for the existence of something, warrant the
conclusion that these data are indeed good evidence for the existence
of that thing. The crucial task is to discover generally accepted con-
ventions concerning what it would be like for a legislature to have an
intention or a purpose. Only then (barring objections of the types
sketched in Section B above) can one go on in an intelligent way
to discuss whether there ever are such things, and to discuss what should
be accepted as good evidence of them.
What are the facts, then? It is obvious that there is considerable
disagreement within the legal community as to whether legislatures
ever have intentions. There is also disagreement as to what would be
adequate evidence of the presence of such intentions. But is there any
appreciable disagreement on what it would be like for a legislature to
have an intention? The answer to this question appears initially to be
"no." With the exception of Kocourek and Bruncken, 0 we have found
no author reluctant to agree that a legislature should be admitted to
have an intention vis-4-vis a statute if each and every member of the
legislature had that intention .3 Furthermore, we have found very few
33. Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 756-58, 790-91.
34. Id. at 789-91.
35. Bruncken's acceptance of the unanimity and majority models of legislative intent
is clearly a concession he makes for the sake of further argument. See Bruncken, supra
note 1, at 130.
36. There may be difficulties with this if it is taken straightfonardly, but these
difficulties have not troubled the skeptics. For example, a legislature can enact a bill into
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authors showing any unwillingness to accept an even weaker condition
-namely, that a legislature should be acknowledged to have an inten-
tion vis--vis a statute in case each of the majority who voted for the
statute had that intention.37 Virtually all the persons who have dis-
cussed the issue of legislative intent seem to assume that the fulfillment
of this last condition is sufficient to support claims about the intention
of a legislature. No one, as far as we have been able to discover, thinks
it necessary even to argue the point. All the hullaballoo has been about
whether that many legislators ever do share any significant intentions
vis-4-vis a statute, and whether, if they do, we can ever know of it.
This apparent agreement should be approached cautiously. Perhaps
it is only a product of the confidence of many skeptics that they need
not go so far as to quetsion it because they can show that the majority
of legislators never share intentions. It is therefore desirable initially
to see whether such confidence is misplaced, or whether it is indeed
unnecessary to investigate the (provisional?) agreement. We shall con-
sider this by way of a detailed examination of the arguments used by
Payne to support his skeptical position. His arguments are not only
the most substantial yet to be offered on the subject, but they also
share crucial claims with the bulk of commentators, both pro and con,
on this problem. One caveat: Payne thinks of legislative intent more
or less in terms of our question No. 5-i.e., in terms of how the legis-
lature intended the (general) words of a statute to be understood.
Perhaps he would extend the argument to include other items on our
list, but this is uncertain.
D. The Futility of the Common Skeptical Arguments
Payne accepts without question the common view that the intentions
of a legislature relative to a statute must be identified with the inten-
tions of those legislators who voted for the bill, and further that the
intentions of the legislature are the intentions those legislators share.
law; a legislator (that is, a member of a legislative assembly) cannot. He can only vote
for the bill in the hope that it will be enacted into law. Thus, for example, a legislator
can at most intend by his vote to help enact the legislation with a view to what it
would, if enacted, achieve. The achievement of the latter is what the legislature might
be said to intend; a contribution to the achievement of the latter might be what the
legislator intends. In what follows, I shall suppose such shifts to be understood.
37. Of course, Kocourek would be unwilling. ]3runcken considers it a concession.
Bruncken, supra note 1, at 130. Radin did not come down decisively either way. Radin,
supra note 1, at 870. Corry shows a deided reluctance to accept it. Corry, The Use of
Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN. BAR REv. 624, 625-26 (1954).
However, he did not show this reluctance earlier. Corry, Administrative Law and the
Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TogoRro L.J. 286, 290 (1936).
196o"]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
But he claims that the legislature cannot have a single state of mind.
Context does much to fix the extension of a general word, but
even the fullest consideration of context generally leaves an un-
certain fringe of meaning, and it is this uncertain fringe of mean-
ing which gives rise to so many problems of statutory interpreta-
tion. For example, is linoleum "furniture"? . . . It is impossible
to decide such questions by reference to the intention of the
legislature since the mental images of the various members of the
legislature who vote for a bill containing such a general word will
exhibit the same imprecision and lack of agreement as found in
the common usage of the word. This would be true even if every
member of the legislature voting for the bill reflected at length
on the extension of the particular general word, for reflection
would not necessarily entail agreement.38
What Payne says here seems quite sensible, but the italicized portion
shows his error. He has tried to move from saying that reflection does
not entail agreement to saying that, even with reflection, agreement
is impossible. This move is illegitimate, and consequently he has not
shown that there cannot be a single state of mind (agreement).
Notice next that his claim about the unlikelihood or impossibility
of a single state of mind is indeterminate. This is revealed by his con-
centration in the above passage upon borderline or "fringe areas" of the
extensions of general words. The question which should be asked
about his claim is-a single state of mind pertaining to what? The
whole extension of the word? Or only some part of that extension?
It is surely not necessary for persons to agree in all cases in order for
them to agree in some cases. What Payne has done here (and does else-
where in his essay) 39 is to claim that there cannot ever be agreement,
although he demonstrates only that there cannot always be agreement.
But surely, if agreement among the legislators is a prerequisite of
legislative intent, a person who wishes to claim that there is legislative
intent in this or that specific case is not bound to claim that there is
always intent in every case. It is true that some persons may have com-
mitted themselves to the view that there is always intent of the sort
Payne is discussing;40 his argument might shake them. But he is very
far from having shown that there cannot sometimes be such intent, or
even that there cannot often be such intent.
Consider next his supposition, shared without argument by Radin,
Jones, de Sloovtre, and perhaps Landis, that in order for several
38. Payne, supra note 27, at 98 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 101-02.
40. Perhaps such a view is implied by Crawford and Llewellyn. See note 15, supra.
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legislators to have the same intention relative to the understanding
of a general word in a statute, it is necessary for them to have had the
same "mental images," at least relative to the instant case.4' Payne
argues:
How can it be said that [the legislator] has any intention in respect
of a particular covered by the general word which did not occur
to his mind... ? [I]t would, I suggest, be a strange use of language
to say that the user of such a general word "intends" it to apply to
a particular that never occurred to his mind 4 2
Payne has only the vestige of a good point here. The behavior of a
man who took Payne seriously could be extraordinary. Suppose that,
needing a large number of ashtrays for an impending meeting in a
building unfamiliar to me, I ask my assistant to scout around and bring
back all the ashtrays he can find in the building. He comes back empty-
handed, saying the following: "I found a good many ashtrays, but
naturally wanted to bring back only those you intended me to bring
back. So, as I picked up each one, I asked myself-did he intend me
to bring this ashtray back? Upon doing this, I realized in each case
that it would certainly be a strange use of language to say that you
'intended' me to bring back that ashtray, as it was virtually certain that
the thought of that ashtray had never occurred to you-after all, you
had never even been in this building before. In the end, therefore, I
found it most sensible to return without any."
Clearly, such behavior would be idiotic. But it is also true that my
assistant could have erred at the opposite extreme. Suppose he had
ripped built-in ashtrays off the walls of the building, snatched ashtrays
from persons using them and removed a hundred thousand ashtrays
from a storage room. In each of these situations I might protest that I
41. See Radin, supra note 1, at 869-70. Landis is diary of this kind of talk, but his
discussion of "determinates" implies a similar view. Landis, A ,'ote on "Statuto, Interpre-
tation," 43 H.Av. L. REv. 886, 889 (1930). For other examples of the view in question, see
Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 CoLust. L. REv. 957, 967 (1940): and
de Sloov&re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L REv. 527, 533-38
(1940). Perhaps Frankfurter would also be sympathetic to this view; see Frankfurter,
supra note 5.
42. Payne, supra note 27, at 101. But he also says later
A statute is a formal document intended to warrant the conduct of judges and
officials, and if any intention can fairly be ascribed to the legislature, it is that the
statute should be applied to situations not present to the mind of its members.
Id. at 105.
The whole challenge lies, if one is to make sense of Payne's arguments, in understanding
how the claims in these two sets of remarks are related to each other, but he does not
enlighten us here. Perhaps he is moving toward the agency theory discussed below.
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had not intended him to do that, and that he should have known better
than to think I did. The ground for the latter claim, however, would
not be that he should have realized that the thought of those particular
ashtrays had never occurred to me; after all, he was already virtually
certain of this. Rather, the ground would be that, given the circum-
stances, he should have understood that I did not need a hundred
thousand ashtrays and that my interest in having ashtrays was not so
pressing as to require him to rip them off walls, etc. It is true that I might
say that the thought never occurred to me that there were any built-in
ashtrays in the building; or, the thought never occurred to me that he
would snatch ashtrays out of people's hands. Thus, I might react against
the claim that I had intended x by making statements roughly in the
form: "the thought of such a thing as x never occurred to me." But the
point of this remark is not merely that the thought of such a thing as
x had not occurred to me; there is also a clear suggestion that if such a
thought had occurred to me I would have excepted such things as x. 43
Without this further suggestion, my remark would surely seem point-
less.
The mere fact that the thought of such a thing as x hadn't occurred
to me does not imply anything about what I did or did not intend. It
follows that in our ashtray case the thought of this or that kind of
ashtray, or the thought of getting ashtrays in this or that kind of cir-
cumstance, need not have occurred to me in order for me to have
intended that my assistant get such ashtrays or get ashtrays under such
circumstances. Payne, Radin and any others who have discussed legis-
lative intent in terms of "mental images," "mental pictures," and
"the contents of the mind of the legislator" have been fundamentally
wrong in certain important respects. If, as the above discussion shows,
a legislator voting for a bill need not actually have thought of each
and every particular that he can reasonably be said to have intended
the words of the bill to cover, nor thought of each and every type of
particular, then the mere fact that two legislators have not thought
43. Note also that the key phrase is not that which Payne's remarks suggest: for, "such
a thing as X" refers to a type of particular rather than to a particular. (Furthermore,
some of the types referred to were types of circumstances rather than types of ashtrays.)
Radin, and by implication Landis, may have had this in mind when discussing the
"determinate" as the issue in litigation. They may, that is, have been referring to issue-
types. More likely, they may have been counting issues in such a way that one and the
same issue could appear in many cases. But if they were doing either, then Radin's talk
about "mental images" and "pictures" becomes inappropriate, as Payne rightly recognizes
and argues. See Payne, supra note 27, at 99; see also Radin, supra note 1, at 869; Landis,
supra note 2, at 887.
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of the same particulars or of particulars of the same types in connection
with some general word in a bill shows neither that they disagreed nor
that they agreed in their intention to have those particulars or par-
ticulars of those types covered by the bill. Of course, what a legislator
did think of does make a difference. But what he did not think of
does not make a difference unless he would have excepted it had he
thought of it.
But how are we to know whether he would have excepted it? Sup-
posing that we cannot interview him (or that, if we did, he and we
might find it difficult to distinguish between his intention then and
his decision now), would not we always be uncertain? Hagerstrom, in
the course of arguing against certain appeals to the intention of the
legislator, thinks so.44 In an interesting discussion of the "unprovided-
for case," he concludes that in reality the decisive factor is only the
degree to which the interpreter's feelings of value are shocked. If, for
example, my assistant, while out gathering ashtrays for me, were to be
shocked by the idea of snatching ashtrays from people currently using
them, he will impute to me an intention not to have him do that, even
though I had made no mention of such a case but had merely said
"bring back all the ashtrays you can find."
But such results are not inevitable. My assistant may react differently.
He may be a very crude fellow, or one who places a much greater im-
portance on having ashtrays for the meeting than I do. In either case,
he might not be disturbed at all by the thought of snatching ashtrays
from people; but, knowing me, he might think: "That silly old fool
would be shocked by this, so I'd better not do it." We can also imagine
the reverse-that is, a case where the assistant is shocked, but, realizing
that I would not be, steels himself to the task.
Imputed intentions may require a fair degree of intimacy with the
person whose intentions are being considered. Even then, there may be
circumstances in which the imputations would be highly uncertain.
These two considerations are important-especially in dealing with
the intentions of legislators vis-4-vis circumstances that, so far as we
can tell, they did not contemplate or foresee. The interpreter of a
statute may be remote in time, place, social stratum or background
from many or all of the legislators who had a hand in enacting the
statute. There may only be a small range of cases in which he can
reasonably impute to them approval or disapproval of various outcomes.
44. HAGERsRmom, op. cit. supra note 19, at 82-83. For other discussions of this point
see HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 97-98 (Tent. ed. 1958); and Witherspoon, supra
note 12, at 776-82.
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But there will surely be such a range, provided that the interpreter is
not completely ignorant of the beliefs and attitudes of these men. The
frequency with which such imputations may be made depends upon the
cases that arise; there may be many or few cases within the range of
reasonable imputation.
45
What, however, of cases where the uncontemplated and unforeseen
things, circumstances, or types thereof are such that the legislator would
not unhesitatingly have designated them by the general words he used?
To return to the ashtray example, suppose that when I asked my assist-
ant to bring back all the ashtrays he could find, it never occurred to
me that he might run across some items that were for me not clearly
ashtrays, but were enough like ashtrays to have made me hesitate over
them.46 If he ran across such items, neither he nor I might be clear
about whether I had intended him to bring them back. Insofar as I
was not certain whether they were ashtrays, I could not be certain that
I had intended him to bring them back; insofar as I was not certain
they were not ashtrays, I could not be certain that I had not intended
him to bring them back. Thus, the question of whether I would have
excepted them if I had thought of them may have no decisive answer.
A common move at this point is to claim that I had no intentions
whatever in connection with such cases. 47 This is misleading. The oc-
currence of such a case may be an occasion for abandoning reliance
upon what was intended; but the abandonment should not be justified
by denying that one had any intentions at all in connection with the
case; it should be justified simply by pointing out that the applicability
of one's intentions to the instant case is not clear, and that appeal to
intentions therefore does not afford guidance in the case. The unde-
cidability is not due to limitations on our tools of investigation (e.g.,
that we do not have total recall); rather it is due both to the fact that
there are limitations on the preciseness of the intentions a person can
have, and to the fact that new experience can challenge the rationale
of old classifications. But it is misleading in such circumstances to
45. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that the imputation spoken of here is not what
Cohen calls "legisputation." Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legis-
lative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 418 (1961). While it agrees with "legisputatlon" in
referring to probable legislative meaning, it concerns meaning at the time of enactment
and not what the legislature would have thought if it had "the awareness of the problems
that hindsight now permits." See also, Bruncken, supra note 1, at 135; Curtis, A Better
Theory of Legal Interpretations, 3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 412 (1950).
46. As most everyone recognizes, this is the type of circumstance faced by the Court
in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1930).
47. Cf. Gray's oft-quoted remark in THE NAruRE AND SOURCE.S OF LAW 173 (2d ed. 1921).
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claim that we had no intentions whatsoever. This claim suggests
something quite false-that there is no connection between the cir-
cumstances and our intentions--whereas, the whole problem lies in
the fact that there is a connection but one which is not clear enough
to afford us guidance when we appeal to the intentions.
It is now timely to reconsider the crucial assumption on which all
the arguments and counterarguments were based-the agreement that
an intention vis-4-vis a bill shared by all the legislators in the majority
voting for the bill would count as an intention of the legislature. As
previously noted, one might argue that this agreement has only been
provisional. One might claim that Radin, Payne and other skeptics
stop here only because they believe they can, even on this assumption,
show the impossibility of such a thing as an intention of a legislature.
43
But the examination of Payne's arguments shows the skeptical argu-
ments to be insufficient. Thus, we are forced to confront the agreement
in question, and consider its status. Is it only provisional? Would most
or all of the skeptics retreat to some position behind it? What would
this position be?
E. The Path of Further Argument
The skeptic might argue that the widespread agreement about the
conditions under which a legislature can have an intention was unrea-
sonable. His grounds could be any or all of the following:
1. That not even the majority condition is taken seriously by a
significant section of the legal community (viz., judges and ad-
ministrators)-that even though legislative intent is possible
and its occurrence not in every respect infrequent, conventional
appeals to it are clearly fictional in the sense of being based upon
wholly inadequate evidence of its presence.
2. That no other models of legislative intent could find serious sup-
port in legislative, judicial and administrative practices.
3. That all models in the end make the obviously unsound move
of treating legislatures as human beings.
4. That, in view of the difficulty of using any of the models proffered
to arrive at plausible accounts of what "legislative intent" could
mean, there are no policy considerations sufficient to support
continued use of the expression.
The first argument should be approached cautiously. Commentators
using it generally exhibit a fatal tendency to assume that the majority
48. The dearest case of this attitude is in Bruncken, supra note 1, at 180.
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condition discussed above is not merely a sufficient but also a necessary
condition for legislative intent. They have failed to recognize that
acceptance of weaker and perhaps even quite different conditions might
be reasonable, and that, therefore, the common run of claims about
legislative intent may not be so strikingly irresponsible or "fictional"
after all.
But this defense merely calls in the second argument: are there any
other such conditions? This is a difficult question. Support for the
"literal truth" of claims that legislatures have acted comes from the
citation of explicit legal rules (for example, constitutional ones) setting
out the circumstances under which the behavior of legislators will
count as an act by a legislature. It is true that even the rules for deter-
mining when a legislature has acted (such as rules determining the
circumstances under which an "enacting" vote can be taken on a bill,
the ways of casting and tallying votes, the proportion of affirmative
votes needed for enactment) are sometimes difficult to interpret and
apply; but legislators clearly go to great lengths to establish explicitly
and precisely the conditions under which the legislature will be re-
garded as having enacted a statute. They have not, however, given any
such formal and extended consideration to the conditions under which
the legislature will be regarded as having an intention, except perhaps
the intention to enact the statute itself and to use the words appearing
in the statute. The acceptance by the legislators of a majority of affirma-
tive votes as constituting (under certain conditions) the enactment of
a statute, sheds no light whatever on what they would accept as con-
stituting a legislative intent outside of an intent to enact the statute
itself. There is no evidence, indeed, that any legislature has, for its
own use, attempted to establish formal criteria for the determination
of legislative intent vis-vis statutes other than the use of statements
of intent somewhere within the statutes themselves.49
Although legislatures have not provided criteria for the determina-
tion of legislative intent, there are relevant judicial and administrative
practices. Not only do judges and administrators regularly refer to
"the intentions of the legislature," but, in various jurisdictions at
various times, more or less regular use is made of "presumptions" as
to the intentions of the legislature-e.g., that there is no intent to
interfere with the common law unless explicitly stated. Use is also made
49. This is not surprising. One can imagine that authoritative expressions about
legislative intent outside the individual statutes would fare no better before judges,
administrators and the public than statutory preambles. They too would require "inter-
pretation" if we were to take them seriously.
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of appeals to records of legislative proceedings as "evidence" of the
intentions of the legislature.
The third argument was that all models of legislative intent will in
the end make the unsound move of treating legislatures as human
beings. As shown earlier, the roots of this argument are very deep.
We shall not pursue the matter further, except to suggest below some
relevant analogies and disanalogies to legal treatments of persons and to
suggest in dosing some possible variations in our attitudes toward the
issue.
The fourth argument was that, in view of the difficulties in arriving
at plausible accounts of what "legislative intent" could amount to on
any of the models put forward, there are no policy considerations suf-
ficient to support continued use of the expression. Although considera-
tions bearing on this argument will also be mentioned briefly at vari-
ous stages of the discussion below, it will be raised again directly only
at the end of the paper.
F. Models of Legislative Intent
The following discussion of models of legislative intent attempts
to discover what support each can muster against the above arguments.
1. The Majority Model. Consider initially the following straight-
forward argument for the sufficiency of the majority model of legisla-
tive intent. On the supposition that judges and administrators believe
themselves to have a legitimate interest in the intentions of the legis-
lature, if there were any such intentions, they might argue as follows:
"The idea of a legislature intending x without any of its members,
officers or agents intending x would hardly give us even a beginning
for an acceptable account of the intentions of the legislature. But, if at
least some member(s), officer(s) or agent(s) of the legislature must
intend x, then which and how many? Given that our interest is in the
intentions of the legislature concerning a statute enacted by it, we may
start by considering the conditions under which the statement 'The
legislature enacted the statute' is true. What, in short, counts as a
legislature's enacting a statute?
"The important thing is to see what, in accordance with constitu-
tional and legislative rules, results in and amounts to the enactment
of a statute. Ordinarily this has to do with majorities of affirmative
votes by the legislators, taken and tallied under specified conditions.50
50. Excluding executive endorsement or acquiescence (the expression "intention of the
legislature" does not require use to consider them), and leaving open whether we would
allow something to count as a statute if it were not subsequently enrolled or promulgated.
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But, if such a coincidence in behavior (voting affirmatively) by a ma-
jority of the legislators is sufficient for and equivalent to saying that
the legislature has acted (i.e., has enacted a piece of legislation), then
a coincidence in the intentions of those very same legislators vis-it-vis
the bill and their affirmative votes for it should be sufficient in deter-
mining what the legislature intended (if anything) by the act or relative
to the act.
"The main principle behind our argument is as follows: When there
is a group, organization or association recognized by a legal system as
a unit for the assignment of rights, powers, duties, etc. (e.g., the legis-
lature has the legal capacity to legislate, and the legislators do not,
either separately or collectively, except when acting in such a way that
they constitute a legislature), certain activities on the part of officers,
agents or employees of the organization will in certain circumstances
be recognized at law as resulting in and amounting to acts of the
organization. In such cases, it is reasonable to identify as the intention
of the organization in so acting at least whatever intentions are shared
by those of its officers, agents, etc., who have discretionary powers in
determining or contributing to the determination of what the group
does. This is a conventional approach to the intentions of corpora-
tions.51 It should apply to legislatures as well."
From the viewpoint of judges and administrators, this hypothesized
argument might seem reasonable. But do the actual practices of these
officials support the majority model argued for? Anyone taking a close
look at current judicial and administrative practices must conclude
that these practices have only the slightest relationship to that model.
While judges and administrators obviously utilize evidence of the
intentions of various individual legislators, they make no serious at-
tempts to discover the actual intentions of the voting majorities;
further, our records of legislative proceedings are still not sufficient
to support such an enterprise. There are presumptions galore about
what, in the light of our records, the legislators must have been aware
of and agreed with, but the realities of legislative processes are such
that few of these presumptions are thought to be reliable enough.
This may persuade some commentators that courts and adminis-
trators generally have not been genuinely interested in the intentions
of legislatures. But the behavior of judges and administrators vis-4-vis
legislative intent would clearly be capricious and irresponsible only if
Accounting for bicameral legislatures would, of course, complicate but not vitiate the
argument.
51. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 47, at 55.
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they believed that the majority model set out necessary as well as suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of legislative intent. There is no
reason to suppose the judges and administrators believe this, nor did
"their" argument above suppose it. Thus there is no good reason to
believe that their behavior is either capricious or irresponsible until
it is seen to be so in the light of a model plausibly supposed to be their
model of the minimal conditions for the existence of legislative intent.
Of course, it may not be necessary to move immediately to searching
for such a weaker model. Instead we may attempt to uphold the
majority model, but restrict the scope of its legitimate application. The
conventional move by commentators is to reject appeals to legislative
intentions in favor of appeals to legislative purposes. 2 For these com-
mentators, appeals to the former are appeals to the aims of the details
of statutes, whereas appeals to the latter are appeals to the much more
highly generalized purposes behind the statutes, taken as wholes.0
The motive behind such a move is obvious. It is an attempt to show
that judicial and administrative practices do support the majority
model of legislative intent if the applicability of the model is restricted
to the more highly general intentions of the legislators." The argu-
ment is that, in view of modem legislative processes, coincident pur-
poses among the legislators regarding the highly general aims of a
statute are more likely than coincident purposes regarding the specific
aims of portions of the statute. Thus, special investigations of each
legislator in the majority relative to such more "general" purposes are
not needed.55
52. This is characteristic of the writers cited supra notes 4.7.
53. See, e.g., Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U.
TORoNTo L.J. 286, 290-92 (1936):
Even the majority who vote for complex legislation do not have any common intention
as to its detailed provisions. Though the intention of the legislature is a fiction,
the purpose or object of the legislation is very real. No enactment is ever passed for
the sake of its details; it is passed in an attempt to realize a social purpose. It is what
is variously called the aim and object of the enactment, the spirit of the legislation,
the mischief and the remedy. (Emphasis added.)
It is not always clear when a commentator is in fact making this move. Talk about the
(general) purposes of the statute sometimes seems to refer to what the statute was
designed to achieve and sometimes to the purposes interpreters can find for the statute. See
Radin, supra note 7, at 422-23, and 406, 408, 411, and 419.
54. Witherspoon in fact extends this generality to consideration, not merely of specific
aims vis-.-vis a particular statute, but also to whole programs of statute-making, and even
to the aims of the legislative process itself, as seen in the light of the traditional functions
of legislatures. See Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 758, 795-805, 831-32.
55. Another argument sometimes made in support of the restriction is that highly
general aims are more important to the legislators themselves than specific aims. Cf.
Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 790, 812, 827. See also HAr & SACKs, op. cit. supra note 44,
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Is it a valid presumption that consensus among the legislators on
various purposes of a statute is more likely in proportion to the gener-
ality of the purposes? A distinction must be drawn between a purpose
that a legislator actually has, and a purpose that he is aware of as one
he is supposed to have or is presumed to have. For, as one considers
purposes of greater and greater generality, it becomes more and more
likely-not so much that the legislators share those purposes-but
rather that they are aware of them as purposes that others have, or as
purposes that they themselves are presumed to have. Witherspoon's
example of such a general "purpose" is:
To have the statutory formula so administered as to avoid specific
procedural or substantive evils collateral to the main purposes of
the statute: e.g., undue federal intrusion into matters normally
committed to resolution by state authority."0
It is easy to imagine a legislator knowing that he is supposed or pre-
sumed to have this purpose or that others have it, but it is also easy
to imagine him not having it-even though he votes for the legislation
in question. Some commentators, realizing that more legislators are
likely to be aware of such purposes than are aware of the specific
purposes of the details of the legislation in question, have either (i) too
facilely assumed that being aware of the purpose is equivalent to having
it, or (ii) too facilely assumed that silence in the face of knowledge that
one may possibly be presumed to share a certain purpose is a good
sign that one actually does share the purpose. In fact, there seems
little reason to believe that the generality of the purpose alone much
increases the confidence with which we can say that the voting majority
has it.
It is not much easier to learn about the general purposes of legislators
than to learn about the specific intentions of legislators. Thus, even if
we look only at general purposes, current judicial and administrative
practices are insufficient to support the majority model. We must
search for another model of legislative intent which comports more
closely with judicial and administrative behavior.
2. The Agency Model. It is possible that judges and administrators
use an agency model of legislative intent. This model recognizes that
legislatures delegate certain responsibilities (such as filling in the
at 1285, where the authors say that "the probative force of materials from the Internal
legislative history of a statute varies in proportion to the generality of its bearing upon
the purpose of the statute or provision in question." (Emphasis added.) They are here
seemingly appealing to both of the above considerations.
56. Witherspoon, supra note 12, at 799-800.
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statutory details) to various persons (legislative draftsmen, committee
chairmen, judges, administrators), and that this may justify appealing
to the intentions of these persons as the intentions of the legislature
regarding the aims of statutes or the details thereof.
Few commentators have explicitly appealed to the agency model, but
several have touched on it. Driedger appears to identify the intention
of the legislature with the intentions of the draftsmen. The competent
draftsman
has in his mind a complete legislative scheme and he attempts to
give expression to that scheme in a logical and orderly manner;
every provision in the statute must fit into that scheme, and the
scheme is as complete as he can conceive it.
It is this legislative scheme that should be regarded as the pur-
pose, object, intent, spirit, of the Act.6
The following remark by Judge Learned Hand suggests identifying
the intentions of the legislature with the intentions of legislative com-
mittees. He says:
[Courts] recognize that while members deliberately express their
personal position upon the general purposes of the legislation, as
to the details of its articulation they accept the work of the com-
mittees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go
on in any other way.58
A remark by de Sloov&e, taken in isolation, suggests turning in quite
a different direction-viz., to the interpreter, or a least to a class of
interpreters. He says:
The only legislative intention, whenever the statute is not plain
and explicit, is to authorize the courts to attribute a meaning to
a statute within the limitations prescribed by the text and by
the context. . .. In other words, a single meaning which the text
will reasonably bear must, if genuine, be considered not as the
conclusion which the legislature would have arrived at, but one
which the legislature by the text has authorized the courts to
find.59
57. DimDcan, op. cit. supra note 16, at 161. See also Bruncken, supra note 1, at 130.
58. SEC v. Collier, 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935). At least one commentator agrees
that Judge Hand's statement here implies agency. See Johnstone, supra note 3, at 14.
59. de Sloovbre, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.LQ. Ra'.
407, 415 (1932). (Emphasis added.) See also Curtis, supra note 45, at 425; and, in comment
on Curtis' view, Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VA"D. L. REV. 493, 494-95, 503, 506 (1950). But de Sloovbre dearly disclaims
that the result of such authorization accords with any supposed legislative intention.
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These remarks suggest that the legislature delegates certain respon-
sibilities to other persons in connection with statutes, and in doing so,
the legislature exhibits its intention to rely on the judgment and dis-
cretion of these persons concerning how to achieve what the legislature
wants the statute to achieve. Consequently, the judgment of these per-
sons, having been authorized by the legislature, may stand for the judg-
ment of the legislature. These persons now have somewhat, if not actu-
ally, the status of agents of the legislature.60 Thus, our discovery of
what these persons intended in attempting to carry out the assignment
of the legislature (e.g., to draft a bill that would, in their judgment,
achieve what the legislature wanted to achieve; to interpret the lan-
guage of the bill so as, in their judgment, to achieve what the legis-
lature wanted to achieve) is a discovery of intentions that the legislature
stood behind, wished us to attend to, wished us to regard as author-
itative as their own-indeed, wished us to regard as their own. These
intentions may therefore be taken as, and in fact are, the intentions of
the legislature.
The agency model would render rational the present "investigations"
of judges and administrators into legislative intent, and it would do
this without reliance on so many presumptions about the significance of
the silence of individual legislators. Investigations of the intentions of
"agents" would be sufficient to establish (because they would be equiv-
alent to) the intentions of the legislature. However, the agency model
is extremely perilous. It not only requires us to consider whether
any of its variations are persuasively similar to typical agency situa-
tions, but it confronts us with difficult problems concerning agency
itself and in particular concerning the reasonableness of identifying
the will of the agent with the will of his principal. Consider the follow-
ing:
(a) If the legislature is to be thought of as the principal, we pre-
sumably would need to know how to identify the actions and intentions
of this principal. But, what model of the latter are we to use? We would
need to feel at home with some other model of legislative intention and
purpose before we could get on with establishing the plausibility of
this new model. Presumably, this earlier model would be the majority
model. But the adequacy of this model has not yet been decisively
established.
60. "An agent . . . is one who acts as a conduit pipe through which legal relations
flow from his principal to another. Agency is created by a juristic act by which one person
(the principal) gives to another (the agent) the power to do something for and in the name




(b) Even within the traditions of agency the proposal that the actions
and judgment of an agent be taken for the actions and judgment of his
principal is open to charges of fictionalizing every bit as severe as the
initial charges concerning the intentions of legislatures (and by wray
of them, concerning the nature of corporate personalities).(' For
example, as with the initial controversy, there would be difficulties
about whether analogies sufficiently strong to support a claim of identity
could be found between the relationship of a principal to his own acts
and his relationship to the acts of his agent.02 Also there will be a worry
similar to our earlier worry about the explicitness of the legal rules
supporting the claims made-that is, a worry about the character of
the "juristic act" by which a person designates someone as his agent,
and about the degree of explicitness needed in such a "bestowal" of
power.6
3
(c) Finally, and closely connected with this last point, each variation
of the agency-model--delegation to committee, to courts, etc.-would
have to be examined separately in order to discover the justifiability
of saying that such a specific "bestowal" of power had actually been
made by the legislature.
The strongest case for the bestowal of such power could surely be
made in the case of legislative reliance upon draftsmen and committee
chairmen. In view of the realities of legislative proceedings, it is cer-
tainly plausible to say that legislatures go very far in relying on the
judgment and discretion of such persons.0 4 When it comes to the inter-
preters of statutes such as judges and administrators, the claim that
legislatures have bestowed such power seems highly dubious. Hager-
strom, for example, gives such a claim short shrift. He says:
Such a general authorization cannot usually be shown to exist. It
is a mere fiction motivated by desire to defend the will-theory, and
it may be compared with similarly motived fictions concerning
customary law as the general will. 5
It should be noted, too, that Hagerstrom is here talking about a well-
hedged and limited authorization.
61. Cf. Hourms, Cou±crE LFGAL PA~pts 49 (1952).
62. Cf. Houms, op. cit. supra note 61, at 52-53, where he is patently exploring preciely
this.
63. Cf. PATON, op. cit. supra note 31, at 287.
64. Cf. Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning:
"The Low Road:" 38 TExAs L. REv. 392, 430 (1959). It should be noted, however, that the
work of draftsmen and committee chairmen has no legal effect until endorsed by the
legislative. This is a striking disanalogy with the customary situation in agency.
65. HAGEPmom, op. cit. supra note 19, at 93.
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One might counter, however, by claiming that the authorization need
not be explicit. In the law of agency, after all, the authorization is not
always explicit either-as in instances of so-called "agency of neces-
sity." 66 It would surely be a matter of "necessity" that the best judg-
ment of judges and administrators be relied upon by legislatures. But
this argument appears to go too far. We would not want in any whole-
sale way to hold legislatures responsible for what judges and adminis-
trators make out of statutes.
So much, then, for various models of legislative intent and for the
justifiability of de novo introduction of the use of such models. We have
seen that one strongly justified model of such intentions (the majority
model) finds little serious support in current judicial and administrative
investigations of the intentions of legislatures. We have also seen that
the model fitting these investigations best (the agency model) is also
the most difficult to justify. But, while the arguments on behalf of
either model cannot be decisive, neither are they negligible. In the end
our use of either or both of the models may depend simply upon how
many ragged edges we are willing to tolerate in the conceptual frame-
work we use to approach legal problems; or, alternatively, our use may
depend, as will be suggested below, on how far we are willing to go
in developing our legal institutions in such a way as to eliminate these
ragged edges.
G. The Significance of Model-Entrenchment
Our exploration of the justifiability of talk about legislative inten-
tions cannot stop here. The "realism" of such talk must be examined
not only from the standpoint of the reasonableness of introducing such
talk in light of our present institutions and practices; it must also be
examined from the standpoint of how the reasonableness of such talk
is supported by the fact that it is already a well-established part of the
legal environment. That is, one should consider whether the established
use of references to legislative intent does not itself produce conditions
under which the references become more reasonable as the practice of
making them becomes entrenched.
Quite apart from any consideration of whether starting the practice
was a good idea in the first place, once it has been started it provides
part of the institutional background against which legislators recognize
themselves to be acting when proposing, investigating, discussing, and
66. See PATON, op. cit. supra note 81, at 287.
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voting for bills. For example, all legislators now understand that views
of the intentions of the legislature may well be formed in the light of
certain standard presumptions (e.g., that there is no intent to interfere
with the common law unless explicitly stated) and "investigations" (e.g.,
of debates and committee reports on the bill). If the legislators have a
capacity to contribute to the materials and to rebut the presumptions
they know will be used by judges and administrators as indicia of the
intentions of the legislature, their behavior will influence what the
intentions of the legislature can reasonably be said to be.
At present, judicial and administrative uses of materials and pre-
sumptions are not always clear or predictable enough to provide a guide
for the legislators. But one can describe circumstances in which the
picture would be much clearer. Courts and administrators could es-
tablish much greater regularity in their use of preparatory materials
and of "presumptions" concerning legislative intent-a regularity
sufficient to enable trained persons to predict with reasonable accuracy
what the outcomes of these uses would be in specific cases.Or Further-
more, legislatures could control the issuing of preparatory materials
with a view to their use in just such ways by judges and administrators.
In such circumstances, judicial and administrative investigations of the
"intentions of the legislature" would surely look more realistic and
reasonable than they do today. Even today, however, circumstances
provide some reason, although perhaps not enough reason, to say that
realistic references to legislative intent can be made. Even now these
references are made in an institutional environment which to some
extent sustains their reasonableness. 08
67. Cf. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND.
L_ Rv. 382, 387 (1950); Mayo, The Interpretation of Statutes, 29 Ausmr_ L.J. 204 (1955);
Jackson, supra note 23, at 537-38. And, for an extreme view, see Silving, A Plea for a Law
of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 512 (1950).
68. Notice in particular how present practices strengthen the temptation of all
participants to treat legislatures as persons. When attempting to discover the intentions
of a person vis-t-vis an action of his, we would think it helpful to be privy to his
deliberations (if any) on whether to engage in that action. On analogy, when attempting
to discover the intentions of a legislature vis-a-vis a statute, we obviously think it helpful
to be privy to its deliberations on whether to enact the statute. Clearly, insofar as judges
and administrators appeal to proceedings on the floor of the house, they are appealing to
the deliberations of the legislature (as well as to the deliberations of the legislators).
This is just what one would do, if he could, when attempting to learn more about the
intentions of any creature. Furthermore, insofar as the investigator thinks that being
privy to such deliberations would be helpful, it is not bemuse he supposes that the picture
gained will be dear, unequivocal and decisive. Deliberations of individuals on important
acts may well be rehearsals of pros and cons quite as indefinite in character as the
proceedings of many legislative deliberations.
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CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed several models of legislative intent and have ex.
amined (1) whether judges and administrators actually could be re-
garded as taking any of them seriously, and (2) whether they would
be justified in taking any of them seriously. As predicted, the results
of this examination are not conclusive. No one model of legislative
intent is either so strongly or so weakly supported as to make its use
either unproblematic or absurd. This is not surprising, given that the
controversy about the intentions of legislatures has gone on for so long.
But it is an important result to reach and to substantiate. We too often
continue to demand clear-cut and decisive answers in the face of facts
that simply will not support such answers, thus perpetuating contro-
versy (because there always is something to be said for the other side)
and rendering ourselves ineffective in dealing with the matters at hand.
Our detailed discussion of the controversy over the existence and dis-
coverability of legislative intent enables us to understand, for example,
the inappropriateness of treating it only as a straight-forward contro-
versy over facts. Instead of continuing to ask only-Are legislatures ca-
pable of intent?-we should also shift to such questions as the following:
(a) Are there any policy considerations sufficient to justify con-
tinuance of references to legislative intent in view of the difficulties
exposed? What, after all, hangs on whether the references are continued?
This is essentially an inquiry into the relevance of appeals to legislative
intent-an inquiry that has not been embarked upon here. But it is
an inquiry given a new twist by what we have shown. The question
is no longer simply: (i) Supposing that there is a legislative intent, what
hangs on appealing to it? It is rather: (ii) Does enough hang on such
appeals to make their continuance worthwhile even in the face of the
difficulties exposed?
But, we may also ask: (b) Is it worth our while in terms of the ideo-
logical and practical importance of such appeals, to seek institutional
changes strengthening the analogies between these appeals and appeals
to intentions elsewhere in law and in life generally (this being the
same for us as increasing the rationality of the appeals)? It is important
to notice that the difficulties exposed above are not unavoidable facts
of life; legislatures and the institutional environments in which they
operate are, in a sense, our creatures and can be altered. Depending
upon the model of legislative intent one has in mind (and I should
emphasize that only the most obvious ones have been examined here),
one may seek to bring the appeals closer to the conditions under which
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we attribute intentions to corporations, to principals via the intentions
of their agents, or, above all, to individual men. The institutional
changes accomplishing this could amount to such diverse measures as
the fixing of formal limits on what may count as good evidence of legis-
lative intent on the one hand, and alterations in the operating proce-
dures of legislatures on the other.
